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The basic theory of market liberalization is a simple one1—create 
proper incentives based on property rights,2 contractual enforcement,3 
competition,4 well-functioning financial markets,5 effective corporate 
                                                                                                                     
*   Professor of Law and University of Florida Research Foundation Professor, University 
of Florida Levin College of Law. 
 1.  See generally John Williamson, Overview: An Agenda for Restarting Growth and 
Reform, in AFTER THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: RESTARTING GROWTH AND REFORM IN LATIN 
AMERICA (Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski & John Williamson eds., 2003). 
 2.  See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN 
THE THIRD WORLD (1989). See also Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support 
Contractual Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 175, 17576 
(Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005) (surveying the literature); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 54 (1990) (“[T]he inability 
of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source 
of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.”). 
 3.  See generally Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, Essay, The Role of Formal Contract 
Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2006). 
 4.  See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002); 
D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special 
Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119 (2009); Cécile Aubert & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 
Multiregulation in Developing Countries 44 (World Dev. Report Paper, Dec. 2000). 
 5.  See generally Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 
(2006). 
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governance,6 investor protection,7 trade openness,8 and rule of law/legal 
institutions.9 These ingredients plus the effective organization of the 
institutions of government and the markets10 lead to economic growth. 
Yet, creating such change is not easy nor does it occur without economic 
and social disruption and without pushback from entrenched interests. 
Thus, the promise of market liberalization has not always delivered.  
In this context of liberalization and privatization, Cuba is charting a 
path that many countries have already transitioned to over the past 25 
years. However, Cuba has a potential late-mover advantage as it 
transitions to a market economy. In addition to a rich theoretical literature 
in economics on how best to establish market mechanisms, there is also 
significant empirical literature describing both what worked and what are 
the shortcomings in the implementation of market liberalization and 
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs).11 This literature also 
speaks specifically to the Latin American experience.12 Overall, Latin 
America, with a history of statist intervention extending into the 1990s 
(and in some cases due to popular resurgence, more recently as well), 
lagged behind US, European, and East Asian development.13 Since the 
                                                                                                                     
 6.  See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 7.  See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 
J. FIN. 1147 (2002). 
 8.  See generally Sebastian Edwards, Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We 
Really Know?, 108 ECON. J. 383 (1998); Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause 
Growth?, 89 AM. CON. REV. 379 (1999). 
 9.  See generally KENNETH DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006); KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW 
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 19601995 (1999); DE SOTO, supra 
note 2, at 186 (“Development is possible only if efficient legal institutions are available to all 
citizens.”); Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the 
Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQ. 1095 (2007); Daniel Kaufmann et al., The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues, (World Bank Policy 
Research, Working Paper No. 5430, 2010). 
 10.  See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); NORTH, supra note 2. 
 11.  William Megginson, Privatization and Finance, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 145, 146 
(2010) (“Well over 100 empirical studies have examined the economic and financial performance 
of privatized companies or industries, either on a case-by-case basis or using multinational or 
multicompany datasets.”). 
 12.  Aldo Musacchio et al., State-Owned Enterprise Reform in Latin America, Inter-
American Development Bank 13 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Discussion Paper No. IDB-DP-401, 
2015). More broadly, the Latin American liberalization and privatization wave did not reduce 
economic inequality. Miguel Székely, The 1990s in Latin America: Another Decade of Persistent 
Inequality, but with Somewhat Lower Poverty, 6 J. APPLIED ECON. 317, 317 (2003) (“[T]here is 
no country in Latin American where inequality declined during the 1990s.”). 
 13.  SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, CRISIS AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE 
ch. 5 (1995). 
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1990s, Latin America’s growing pains in introducing liberalization have 
been significant.14 As such, Cuba can learn from the mistakes made in 
prior Latin American (and other) market liberalizations to create a more 
effective strategy to bring economic prosperity to its people.  
The reason why SOEs and liberalization matter so much for Cuba is 
that Cuba lacks capital to improve its infrastructure, modernize its 
existing SOEs, and invest in growth. Liberalization can help transform 
Cuba and promote the well-being of its citizens. Part of this liberalization 
will occur by reforming Cuba’s SOEs (including privatization). Changes 
to SOE structure to liberalize SOEs can have profound changes on the 
Cuban economy. If a country improved the efficiency of SOEs by a mere 
5%, the World Bank estimates that in that country, this efficiency gain 
could free up approximately 15% of a country’s GDP.15 Greater 
privatization and market liberalization, if managed properly with an 
effective competition policy framework, can create dynamic growth that 
can help navigate Cuba out of a potential middle income trap (once the 
initial growth/catch up phase has subsided).16  
Part of the complexity of Cuban economic liberalization is that both 
the future and pace of its transition are unclear. Though Cuba has slowly 
begun liberalization, whether the current pace of gradual change and the 
desire to maintain that change within a socialist system will continue 
remains unknown.  
Cuba has gone through phases of liberalization, including most 
importantly the Lineamientos de la política económica y social del 
                                                                                                                     
 14.  See generally D. Daniel Sokol, The Second Wave of Latin American Competition Law 
and Policy, in COMPETITION LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (Julián Peña & Marcelo 
Calliari eds., 2016) [hereinafter Sokol, Second Wave]; ELEANOR M. FOX & D. DANIEL SOKOL, 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (2009). 
 15.  Maria Vagliasindi, Governance Arrangements for State Owned Enterprises, 2 (World 
Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 4542, 2008). 
 16.  John Davies & Ania Thiemann, Competition Law and Policy: Drivers of Economic 
Growth and Development, OECD COHERENCE FOR DEV., Jan. 2015, at 1, available at https:// 
www.oecd.org/development/002014381_CfD_E-book_FINAL%20VERSION%20FOR%20WE 
B.pdf [https://perma.cc/K85M-PHNG]. 
Competition – the rivalry between firms – benefits countries and people through 
various channels. First, a solid competition framework provides a catalyst to 
increase productivity as it generates the right incentives to attract the most 
efficient firms. Second, a strong competition policy can be an effective tool to 
promote social inclusion and reduce inequalities as it tends to open up more 
affordable options for consumers, acting as an automatic stabiliser for prices. 
Third, competition promotes innovation as firms facing competitive rivals 
innovate more than monopolies. Competition mechanisms can even help deliver 
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Partido y la Revolución in 2011,17 in which the Communist Party outlined 
market liberalization in Cuba though the government still maintained 
substantial control over the economy. In some ways, Cuba’s current 
undertaking seems to be a similar model to the Chinese experience. China 
has managed its state capitalism in a gradual way across a number of areas 
of its governance.18 As Calomiris et al., describe: 
China's approach to privatization and liberalization has been 
piecemeal and gradual, and state dominance over economic affairs 
remained largely intact during the process of privatization. During 
the 2001 episode that we study here, when the government 
contemplated the sale of remaining state shares in partly privatized 
firms, the Chinese government's proposed sale of its shares did not 
coincide with a broad economic liberalization. Thus, actual and 
prospective privatization in China occurred within an unusual 
economic and political environment, in which the government 
maintained substantial control over the economy.19 
However, the Chinese model of SOE reform and liberalization is not 
the only one. By improving relations with the United States, the speed of 
Cuban liberalization may change. Similarly, as the leaders of the Cuban 
revolution ages out, the next generation of leaders may have a different 
agenda, particularly because the regime that traditionally propped up the 
Cuban economy (Venezuela) is itself in significant economic turmoil and 
no longer capable of subsidizing Cuba.20 Increased tourism and trade with 
the United States also might lead to greater knowledge diffusion, in part 
through increased use of internet and mobile telephony, which may 
facilitate increased demand by the Cuban people for more political 
freedom to go hand in hand with more economic freedom. Further, 
because of historic ties and a large Cuban-American lobbying group, 
                                                                                                                     
 17.  ECURED, Lineamientos de la política económica y social del Partido y la Revolución, 
(2013), http://www.ecured.cu/Lineamientos_de_la_pol%C3%ADtica_econ%C3%B3mica_y_ 
social_del_Partido_y_la_Revoluci%C3%B3n [https://perma.cc/A6QN-SK8T]. 
 18.  Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the 
Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, § I.A (2015). 
 19.  Charles W. Calomiris, Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: 
Evidence from Chinese Asset Sales, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 399, 40001 (2010) (“Our regression results 
suggest that government ownership is associated with benefits to government-connected firms in 
an economy like China's where government continues to exercise substantial control over the 
economy.”). 
 20.  Noris Soto, Venezuela Economic Crisis to Only Get Worse, Barclays Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-25/venezuela-
economic-crisis-to-only-get-worse-barclays-says [https://perma.cc/PHU2-VAYD] (“Venezuela 
is suffering the deepest economic crisis in its history with output expected to contract 9.1 percent 
this year . . .”).  
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U.S.-based government aid and private investment might be conditioned 
on certain economic changes or simply may create a pressure point for 
the Cuban government to liberalize further in order to benefit from the 
potential size of U.S. investment. The future political economy of Cuba 
remains uncertain, but any of the above options are possible, as are many 
alternatives. 
This Article outlines core concerns for Cuba in its market 
liberalization process. First, from the agency cost perspective, it explores 
the limitations of SOEs versus private (publicly traded) firms. Then, it 
examines the empirical literature on SOEs and SOE reforms and 
privatizations. Next, the Article offers a number of possible policies 
going forward that will allow Cuba to reform its state capitalism to benefit 
Cuba’s consumers. Such reforms include SOE corporatization, SOE 
privatization, and the introduction of a competition policy system to Cuba 
(as effective corporate governance and competition may be substitutes 
for each other).21  
I. SOES, INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE  
SOEs differ from privately owned firms in terms of their incentives 
and, as a result, their corporate governance structure.22 First, unlike 
private firms, SOEs are not necessarily profit maximizers. Hence, SOEs 
perform worse than private firms.23 SOEs perform poorly because they 
have more severe principal agent problems than private firms do.24 In a 
traditional private firm (whether privately held or publicly traded), 
managers are compensated for their performance, which better aligns 
incentives between owners and managers to reduce agency costs.25 This 
                                                                                                                     
 21.  See generally Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 211 (1950); George J. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J. L. & ECON. 54 (1958). 
 22.  Paul L. Joskow et al., Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from 
the Electric Utility Industry, 27 RAND J. ECON. 165, 168 (1996). 
 23.  See generally Alvaro Cuervo & Belén Villalonga, Explaining the Variance in the 
Performance Effects of Privatization, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 581 (2000); Joanna L.Y. Ho et al., 
Control Privatization, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance: Evidence from China, 10 
J. INT’L ACCT. RES. 23 (2011); Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Determinants of Privatization Prices, 
112 Q.J. ECON. 965, 967–68 (1997); William L. Megginson et al., The Financial and Operating 
Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 403 
(1994). 
 24.  Privatization can significantly mitigate the agency cost problem of SOEs because 
market mechanisms can be used with regard to managerial compensation. Nevertheless, the 
decision to privatize can be highly political, even when privatization itself would improve firm 
performance. I. Serdar Dinç & Nandini Gupta, The Decision to Privatize: Finance and Politics, 
66 J. FIN. 241, 24850 (2011). 
 25.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976). 
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alignment decreases the agent’s temptation to shirk their managerial 
responsibility.26 One way in which this is done is through incentive based 
pay.27 
Paradoxically, SOEs exist in large numbers despite the theoretical and 
empirical justifications to move to full privatization. State capitalism 
survived the liberalization and privatization wave of the 1990s and 2000s 
worldwide, including in Latin America.28 Indeed, in many countries, 
SOEs produce 2030% of its GDP.29 There are a number of reasons for 
this. First, SOEs and state capitalism may have cultural factors.30 Second, 
Chinese SOEs in particular make up a large number of the Fortune Global 
100 in terms of revenues. Third, in some areas, larger political 
preferences may justify state ownership under certain circumstances, 
such as in the provision of public goods like education and health care.31 
But the SOEs of today bear little resemblance to the SOEs of the 1980s: 
today’s SOEs may be publicly traded as an SOE hybrid of mixed 
ownership (with both minority and majority owned by the state); or may 
be modeled on a corporatized form. This holds true for both OECD 
countries and emerging markets.32 Thus, many SOEs have moved to a 
profile in which metrics of profitability are more important than they once 
were,33 which has led to the restructuring and reformation of SOEs. 
Consequently, the view of a monolithic SOE that relies on central 
planning is a relic of the past in most countries other than Cuba. 
The limits of SOEs encompass a broad literature but I provide some 
basic points herein.34 A traditional SOE does not align incentives—
whether a manager performs well or poorly they are paid the same. As 
                                                                                                                     
 26.  Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 782 (1972). 
 27.  Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 22526 (1990). 
 28.  Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G. Lazzarani, Chinese Exceptionalism or New Global 
Varieties of State Capitalism, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? THE INSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 
2015). 
 29.  Id. at 407. 
 30.  Narjess Boubakri et al., National Culture and Privatization: The Relationship Between 
Collectivism and Residual State Ownership, 47 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 170, 172 (2016) (“We find 
that residual government ownership in privatized firms is associated with lower performance, 
efficiency, risk taking, and valuation in more collectivist societies.”). 
 31.  See generally Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private 
Ownership of Public Goods, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1343 (2001). 
 32.  Musacchio & Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 33.  Id. at 2. 
 34.  See generally Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2917 (2012); D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713 (2009) [hereinafter Sokol, 
Corporate Governance]. 
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such, SOE managers do not have effective mechanisms of accountability 
to the SOE and its owners.35 Privatizing ownership and creating pay 
incentives through bonuses and stock ownership alleviates this agency 
cost problem.36 Further, SOEs may have multiple objectives that conflict: 
profit maximizing may not align with other goals such as employment37 
or social goals.38 Both of these factors play some role in reducing SOE 
efficiency and in limiting the success of SOEs relative to private 
corporations.39  
Empirical work on stock and bond markets and SOEs supports the 
prior theoretical scholarship. With regard to equity markets, Chen, Firth, 
and Xu find that a change in control over to private hands leads to better 
financial performance.40 Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset analyze the 
political determinants of the cost of equity with a data set of 236 firms 
that were privatized between 1987 and 2006 in 38 countries.41 They find 
that the cost of equity increased with government ownership.42 
New research on debt markets also sheds light on SOE performance. 
There should be a risk premium associated with borrowing money for an 
SOE. Banks should lend at a higher rate of interest to SOEs since SOEs 
are more likely to be poorly managed relative to private firms. However, 
because the government either explicitly or tacitly guarantees SOE debt 
(which it does not do for most private firms),43 SOEs have an advantage 
over their private competitors. Recent work by Borisova et al., examine 
bond credit spreads to find that SOEs are generally associated with higher 
cost of debt but have lower cost of debt during a financial crisis.44  
The picture of SOEs and debt is clearer based on the amount of state 
ownership. Borisova and Meggison find that as firms privatize they 
                                                                                                                     
 35.  Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1426–27 (2003). 
 36.  See generally Michael I. Cragg & I. J. Alexander Dyck, Privatization and Management 
Incentives: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 176 (2003). 
 37.  Maxim Boycko et al., A Theory of Privatisation, 106 ECON. J. 309, 309 (1996). 
 38.  Ronald Wintrobe, The Market for Corporate Control and the Market for Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 435, 435–36 (1987). 
 39.  Musacchio & Lazzarani identify these two problems as Type I (corporate governance 
and Type II (fiscal governance) problems of SOEs. Musacchio & Lazzarani, supra note 28, at 10. 
 40.  Gongmeng Chen et al., Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: 
Efficiency Gains in China’s Listed Companies, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 161, 188 
(2008). 
 41.  Hamdi Ben Nasr et al., The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from 
Newly Privatized Firms, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 605, 608 (2012). 
 42.  Id. at 639. 
 43.  Giuliano Iannotta et al., The Impact of Government Ownership on Bank Risk, 22 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 152, 154 (2012). 
 44.  Ginka Borisova et al., Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from 
Government Investments in Publicly Traded Firms, 118 J. FIN. ECON. 168, 169 (2015). 
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confront a higher cost of debt as the amount of state ownership 
diminishes.45 However, after completing privatization, companies that 
fully privatized have lower credit spreads than firms that only partially 
privatized.46 These findings suggest that investors are more concerned 
with partial privatization than full privatization because the role of the 
state in a partially privatized firm is murky and creates investment risk. 
Industrial policy also plays a role within a broader SOE and state 
capitalism agenda. Government has an interest in ensuring that its SOEs 
succeed. As such, the government as regulator may restrict competition 
by providing various benefits to SOEs that it does not offer to other firms. 
Though this might result in direct preferences to SOEs, it may also create 
indirect preferences, such as implicit loan guarantees for favorable 
lending, regulatory preferences such as the creation of a large monopoly 
position in related industries, limitations on foreign ownership, or hidden 
subsidies through either no taxation or more lax corporate governance 
requirements vis-á-vis private firms. Other studies provide initial analysis 
of sovereign wealth funds and their level of independence from 
government control (and political objectives), of Chinese SOEs and their 
governance both home and abroad, and of state ownership and industrial 
policy in antitrust/industrial organizations that distort competition.47 
These issues will confront Cuba as well, depending on the industries and 
companies that Cuba views to be “strategic.”  
II. SOLUTIONS 
A. Privatization 
The economic impact of privatization of SOEs has been tremendous. 
As Megginson notes, “[s]ince 1977, governments around the world have 
raised almost $2.0 trillion by selling SOEs to private investors and 
corporations.”48 He adds that success occurred because “privatization has 
proven influential because of the industrial and financial importance of 
                                                                                                                     
 45.  Ginka Borisova & William L. Megginson, Does Government Ownership Affect the 
Cost of Debt? Evidence from Privatization, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2693, 2733 (2011). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY (2009); Eleanor M. Fox & 
Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition? The Role for Competition Law, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 769 (2014); D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 
10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2013); Sokol, Corporate Governance, supra note 34; Milhaupt & Zheng, 
supra note 18, at 665; Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic Politics and China's Anti-Monopoly 
Law, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 671 (2014). 
 48.  Megginson, supra note 11, at 147. 
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the companies selected for divestment because the largest sales were 
executed through [share issue privatization] that massively impacted 
national stock market capitalizations and liquidity.”49  
Cuba may want to follow some kind of sequencing of privatization. 
Even partial (non-majority) privatization has reduced traditional SOE 
problems, at least in the case of Indian SOEs that were partially 
privatized.50 Further, according to work that examines privatizations 
from 1990 to 2001 and includes 25 countries, sequencing privatizations 
gradually (rather than all at once privatizations) leads to more effective 
outcomes.51 Work by Vaaler and Schrage provides additional 
understanding on how best to stage privatization. A non-controlling 
(minority) stake for partially privatizing SOEs signals state support for 
the enterprise in countries where the possibility of investment policy 
reversal is high, but that such policy has limited time duration 
effectiveness.52 Empirically, financial returns are abnormal for the first 
one to two years after privatization when partial state ownership ranges 
from 1530%.53 Related work by James and Vaaler finds that minority 
state ownership (particularly in countries with low state stability) reduces 
the risk of low policy stability and that when the state owns 2130% of a 
project’s equity, the risk decreasing effect of minority state ownership 
maximizes.54 
Research has not yet answered a question on sequencing and effects 
post privatization. We do not know if privatization would be more 
effective if the stock were listed in a local market versus in the U.S., U.K., 
or dual listed markets. That is, does the bonding hypothesis (where higher 
quality standards in U.S. and U.K. markets bonding firms to better 
corporate governance) hold for partially private (but still SOE controlled) 
firms?55 There is evidence that cross listing leads to better corporate 
governance for Brazilian, Korean, and Indian firms. The evidence, 
however, does not clarify whether this results from a self-selection effect 
                                                                                                                     
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Nandini Gupta, Partial Privatization and Firm Performance, 60 J. FIN. 987, 990 
(2005). 
 51.  Fabian Gouret, Privatization and Output Behavior During the Transition: Methods 
Matter!, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 3, 32 (2007).  
 52.  Paul M. Vaaler & Burkhard N. Schrage, Residual State Ownership, Policy Stability 
and Financial Performance Following Strategic Decisions by Privatizing Telecoms, 40 J. INT’L 
BUS. STUD. 621, 623 (2009). 
 53.  Id. at 635–36. 
 54.  Barclay E. James & Paul M. Vaaler, Minority Rules: Credible State Ownership and 
Investment Risk Around the World 2 (Minn. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 16-06, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2730780 [https://perma.cc/PLN3-T83K]. 
 55.  See generally G. Andrew Karolyi, Corporate Governance, Agency Problems and 
International Cross-Listings: A Defense of the Bonding Hypothesis, 13 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 
516 (2013). 
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in which the cross listing itself indicates the existing quality of corporate 
governance; or whether the very process of cross listing improves 
corporate governance. In the case of Chinese SOEs, foreign listings may 
also serve the private interests of SOE managers rather than those of 
shareholders.56 One study finds that non-politically connected firms do 
better in foreign stock listings in terms of greater profitability, but that 
politically connected firms provide more benefits for managers (with 
poorer performance)—such politically connected SOE managers were 
more likely to receive media attention and promotion to a senior 
government position within a five year period after the foreign stock 
listing.57 
When governments choose partial privatization, they retain some 
ownership, either as the majority or minority shareholder. These firms 
perform better than 100% government owned SOEs but less well than 
100% privately owned firms.58 How well these firms perform relies in 
part on how much government interferes with the profit-making mission 
that a purely private firm would have.59  
B. Corporatization 
Through increased corporatization SOEs have tried to mimic private 
firm governance. In the Chinese setting, increased corporatization has led 
to improved performance because of better monitoring and a reduction of 
agency costs.60 This only partially fixes the issue as private ownership 
still leads to greater returns than does government ownership.61 Where 
the gains of privatization have been limited, it may be because even after 
an IPO, a controlling stake of the SOE remains in government hands.62 
In such settings, incentives within the firm may not fully align to reduce 
agency costs.63 
Indeed, even from the standpoint of SOE managers, responding to a 
                                                                                                                     
 56.  Mingyi Hung et al., Political Considerations in the Decision of Chinese SOEs to List 
in Hong Kong, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 435, 436 (2012). 
 57.  Id. at 448. 
 58.  Gupta, supra note 50, at 1011. 
 59.  Other forms of state ownership include state owned holding companies (to control a 
number of SOEs), state development banks, and sovereign wealth funds. However, these 
variations of state capitalism are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 60.  Varouj A. Aivazian et al., Can Corporatization Improve the Performance of State-
Owned Enterprises Even Without Privatization?, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 791 (2005).  
 61.  Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 
14748. 
 62.  Chen et al., supra note 40, at 161–62. 
 63.  Gongmeng Chen et al., Have China's Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved Efficiency 
and Profitability?, 7 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 82 (2006) (providing evidence of more limited value 
of Chinese privatizations in which the state retains a controlling interest.). 
10
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 29 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 14
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol29/iss1/14
2017] STATE CAPITALISM IN CUBA: THE LESSONS OF THE LITERATURE ON STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 221 
 
desire to increase firm performance creates problems since SOE 
managers “will bear many of the costs (i.e., angry workers, disgruntled 
suppliers) . . . Thus managers of SOEs have no incentive to improve 
efficiency or develop innovative and new products.”64 Yet, the same 
managers from SOEs perform better under private ownership.65 This 
suggests that the incentive alignment problem can be solved long term. 
In the near term, increased corporatization may on the margins improve 
SOE profitability and also serve as a first step to eventual privatization. 
C. Performance Contracts 
Regulation provides one way to address the principal-agent problem 
when the regulator is the principal and the agent is the regulated firm.66 
This solution is effective in some industry settings (although within 
private firms).67 Performance contracts create a mechanism to reduce 
monitoring costs by decreasing information asymmetries and allowing 
for benchmarking of performance of SOE managers. Overall, however, 
high powered incentives may limit this approach because it may create 
opportunities for capture of the regulator.68  
D. Introduce Competition Policy 
Cuba needs to introduce competition. This includes both reducing 
barriers to entry as well as introducing a competition law.69 Competition 
law and policy play an important role to ensure that the gains of market 
liberalization accrue to consumers rather than to monopolists.70 As 
privatization begins, private monopoly should not replace public 
monopoly. Further, favored firms may lobby government to create 
restraints against new entrants under the guise of public interest that 
                                                                                                                     
 64.  WILLIAM L. MEGGISON, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 39 (2005). 
 65.  See generally Catherine D. Wolfram, Increases in Executive Pay Following 
Privatization, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 327 (1998). 
 66.  JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN REGULATION AND 
PROCUREMENT, ch. 13 (1993); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Using Cost Observation to 
Regulate Firms, 94 J. POL. ECON. 614 (1986). 
 67.  Chungrun Ai & David Sappington, The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the 
U.S. Telecommunications Industry, 22 J. REG. ECON. 133 (2002). 
 68.  The potential of capture in such settings presents a role for competition advocacy. For 
an overview of such advocacy, see Allan Fels & Wendy Ng, Rethinking Competition Advocacy 
in Developing Countries, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. 
Cheng, & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2014); Dae-Sik Hong, Competition Advocacy of the Korean 
Competition Authority, in COMPETITION AND THE STATE (Thomas K. Cheng, Ioannis Lianos, & D. 
Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).  
 69.  Sokol, Second Wave, supra note 14. 
 70.  D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1247 (2015). 
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instead may hurt consumers.71 Rather, the Cuban economy must be 
liberalized as part of a broader competition policy to reduce barriers of 
entry for new businesses and to allow new businesses to innovate.72 
Cuban companies have thus far been shielded from competition. As with 
other monopolists, this means that Cuban firms innovate less than firms 
in other countries that face competition.  
Competition also protects against collusion.73 When firms illegally 
raise levels above the competitive price, it has negative repercussions 
across the entire Cuban distribution chain and victimizes consumers. The 
introduction of anti-cartel law also protects against bid rigging in public 
procurement tenders.74  
Domestic cartels may not be impacted by the benefits of international 
trade because such cartels may arise in the non-tradable sectors of the 
economy.75 The lack of a competition culture also needs to change in 
Cuba. Promoting a competition culture creates social sanctions for 
cheating the people of lower prices for private gain.  
III. CONCLUSION 
There are a number of possible ways forward for Cuba and its 
introduction of greater economic liberalization, privatization and 
competition. These strategies are not mutually exclusive and different 
strategies may be taken for different SOEs depending on the 
                                                                                                                     
 71.  Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Brother, May I?: The Challenge of 
Competitor Control Over Market Entry, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 111 (2016). Firms that are 
politically connected have advantages to firms that lack such connections in companies. See, e.g., 
Stijn Claessens, Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign 
Contributions, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 554 (2008); Eitan Goldman, Do Politically Connected Boards 
Affect Firm Value?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2331 (2009). This may be particularly true in countries in 
which there is some form of state capitalism (though not always in ways that create value for the 
firms). Raymond Fisman, Estimating the Value of Political Connections, 91 AMER. ECON. REV. 
(2001); Victor Nee & Sonja Opper, Political Capital in a Market Economy, 88 SOCIAL FORCES 
2105 (2010); Wenfeng Wu et al., Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence 
from China, 18 EURO. FIN. MGMNT. 695 (2012). 
 72.  This is a global issue as the United States also faces issues of lack of competitiveness. 
See Press Release, The White House, Exec. Order--Steps to Increase Competition and Better 
Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the Am. Econ. (Apr. 15, 2016), 
available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/15/executive-order-
steps-increase-competition-and-better-inform-consumers [https://perma.cc/UU8N-WJ3N]. 
 73.  Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel 
Prosecutions, 48 REV. INDUS. ORG. 405 (2016); Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Evolution 
of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 57 J.L. & ECON. S51 (2014). 
 74.  Fighting Cartels in Public Procurement, OECD POLICY BRIEF (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/41505296.pdf. [https://perma.cc/JYW5-CPZG]. 
 75.  D. Daniel Sokol & Andreas Stephan, Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing 
World Competition Agencies, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 68 at 141. 
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particularized facts of the SOE and its industry. Managing liberalization 
and privatization allows Cuban consumers to enjoy the economic benefits 
that the market can provide in terms of greater growth and innovation. 
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